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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Of Takeovers, Foreign Investment and Human




In September 2004 Toronto-based Noranda Inc. (“Noranda”), one
of the world’s largest producers of nickel and copper,1 and China Min-
metals Corp. (“Minmetals”), a state-owned Chinese company whose
2005 revenues exceeded US$17.78 billion,2 announced exclusive talks
regarding a potential 100 percent buyout of Noranda.3 The proposed
friendly takeover was expected to be valued at approximately US$7.4
billion. In late October, Noranda CEO Derek Pannell stated that due-
diligence on the deal was nearing completion and that legal documents
were in preparation.4 The dynamic, however, shifted in mid-November
when Noranda announced that the exclusivity period for negotiations
had expired and would not be renewed. While Noranda’s shareholders
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. I gratefullyacknowledge
those who have discussed the ideas articulated in this piece with me, including Ian
Lee, David Wiseman, Maureen Irish, Brian Masse, Poonam Puri and TonyVanDuzer.
I owe particular thanks to Bruce Elman and to Vincent-Joe¨l Proulx and Mercedes
Perez for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also acknowledge with appre-
ciation the research assistance of Eli Udell, the research and editorial assistance of
Faran Umar-Khitab and the support of grants from the Foundation for Legal Research
and the Law Foundation of Ontario. Last, I am indebted to Stephanie Ben-Ishai,
General Editor of the Banking & Finance Law Review.
1 At the time, Noranda ranked first globally in zinc production and ninth in copper
production. See Ian Austen, “Chinese Plan to Buy Big Miner Stirs Canadians Left
and Right” The New York Times (29 October 2004) W1.
2 See online: China Minmetals Corporation http://www.minmetals.com/English/e
2 4.htm.
3 Noranda Inc., News Release, “Noranda and China Minmetals Enter into Exclusive
Negotiations” (24 September 2004), online: CCNMatthews http://cnrp.ccnmatt
hews.com/client/noranda/release en.jsp?actionFor526016&releaseSeq5&
year2004.
4 Kevin Foster, “Noranda Open to Suitors; Minmetals won’t Commit” American Metal
Market (17 November 2004) 1.
78 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [22 B.F.L.R.]
were informed that discussions between the two companies would con-
tinue on a non-exclusive basis, Noranda had left itself open to offers
from other parties.5 In early March 2005, Pannell stated that Minmetals
was still interested in purchasing Noranda but expressed frustration at
the lengthy process, which was depressing Noranda’s share value.6
At the time, Noranda owned 59 percent of leading Canadian nickel
producer Falconbridge Limited (“Falconbridge”).7 On March 9th, it was
announced that the boards of Noranda and Falconbridge had unani-
mously agreed to a merger that would be effected by a share exchange
takeover bid by Noranda.8 The successful amalgamation was announced
on June 30th9 and had the effect of ending Minmetals’ interest as pur-
chasing the merged company would prove too costly.10 Most recently,
Falconbridge, Inco Limited and Phelps Dodge Corporation announced
a US$56 billion three-way combination which, if all necessary precon-
ditions are met, will create one of the largest global mining companies.11
While this factual matrix is seemingly innocuous, Minmetals’ pro-
posed takeover of Noranda actually catalyzed an intense controversy.12
5 Noranda Inc., News Release, “Noranda Update on Negotiations with China Min-
metals” (16 November 2004), online: CCNmatthewshttp://cnrp.ccnmatthews.com/
client/noranda/release en.jsp?actionFor441200&releaseSeq0&year2004.
6
“China Minmetals Still Keen on Buy: Noranda” (1 March 2005), online: Peoples’
Daily Online http://english.people.com.cn/200503/02/eng20050302 175244
.html.
7 See Austen, supra, n. 1.
8 Noranda Inc., News Release, “Noranda and Falconbridge Agree to Combine” (9
March 2005), online: CCNMatthews http://cnrp.ccnmatthews.com/client/noranda/
release en.jsp?actionFor533910&releaseSeq14&year2005.
9 The amalgamated company continued under the name Falconbridge Limited. See
Falconbridge Limited, News Release, “Noranda and Falconbridge Complete Amal-




“Chinese Encounter Pitfalls Abroad” Taipei Times (14 April 2005), online: Taipei
Timeshttp://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2005/04/14/2003250455.
11 The new company would operate under the name Phelps Dodge Inco Corporation.
See Inco Inc., News Release, “Phelp Dodge, Inco and Falconbridge Agree to US$56
Billion Three-Way Combination, Creating One of World’s Largest Mining Com-
panies” (26 June 2006), online: Inco http://www.inco.com/newinco/en/news/re-
leases/june 26 2006.asp.
12
“There has not been a fuss quite like it since the turn of the century when a C$50
billion wave of takeovers pushed U.S. control of Canadian oil and gas production
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The proposed transaction reflects a current wave of Chinese expansion.
After decades of preventing its companies from overseas investment,
the Chinese government has permitted a dramatic increase in outward
cross-border merger and acquisition activity.13 In 1995, the outward
foreign direct investment (“FDI”) stock holdings of Chinese companies
were valued at US$15.8 billion. In 2003, this figured increased substan-
tially to US$37.0 billion.14 In order to facilitate this outward growth, by
2003 China had entered into over 100 bilateral investment treaties with
various other states.15
This trend has seen Chinese companies make a number of high-
profile movements, including a failed 2005 bid by the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”) for U.S. oil and gas producer
Unocal Corporation (“Unocal”).16 While Unocal’s shareholders even-
tually approved a merger with Chevron Corporation,17 U.S. Congres-
sional reaction to the CNOOC offer was characterized by a suspicion
and hostility that was predicated on economic nationalism and concerns
over national security.18 These factors were undoubtedly present in the
close to 60 percent. . ..” See Gary Park, “China Confuses Canada” Petroleum News
(7 November 2004), online: Petroleum News http://www.petroleumnews.com/
pntruncate/976669376.shtml.
13 Friedrich Wu, The Globalization of Corporate China (Seattle: National Bureau of
Asian Research, 2005) at 5.
14 Ibid., at 8.
15 Ibid., at 7. Canada and China are currently in the process of negotiating a Foreign
Investment Protection Agreement, with the desired effect being enhanced protection
for investors of one party in the other party’s territory. See “Regional and Bilateral
Initiatives,” online: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/RB/china-en.asp. Most recently, anegotiatingses-
sion was held in China during April 2006. No particular timeline has been established
for negotiations to be completed. See e-mail from Consultations and Liaison Divi-
sion, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to Faran Umar-Khitab
(17 May 2006) on file with author.
16 Wu, supra, n. 13 at 3.
17 Unocal Corporation, News Release, “Unocal Stockholders Approve Merger with
Chevron” (10 August 2005), online: Unocal http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/
2005news/081005.htm.
18 See Wu supra, n. 13 at 3, 18, 20; and Steve Lohr, “Unocal Bid Denounced at Hearing”
The New York Times (14 July 2005) C1. The opposition from Capitol Hill caused
CNOOC to withdraw its US$18.5 billion bid on August 2, 2005. See “China Bashing:
Giving China a Bloody Nose” The Economist (6 August 2005) 83. For a critique of
this reaction, see David Olive, “US Seeing China Inc; Reaction of US Lawmakers
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Canadian debate surrounding the Noranda-Minmetals affair.19 However,
unlike the CNOOC bid, the Noranda-Minmetals affair was distinguished
by the prevalence of human rights issues. While these issues were rele-
vant to the CNOOC bid, they appear to have been peripheral. In other
words, some in the U.S. argued that allowing the CNOOC transaction
to proceed would strengthen the fist of an already repressive Chinese
regime.20 In contrast, while this argument was certainly made in Canada
(and will be discussed in more detail below), the Canadian discourse
also focused on substantive human rights concerns that were specific to
the bidder, Minmetals.
Had a final agreement between Noranda and Minmetals been
reached, it would have required the approval of the Canadian govern-
ment. For example, a finalized deal would have engaged Canada’s for-
eign investment review process under the Investment Canada Act.21 The
human rights concerns associated with Minmetals were considered to
be of such salience that the federal government, acknowledging its own
trepidation, surprisingly announced that these concerns would be taken
into consideration during any governmental review of the takeover.22
Thus far, the proposed Minmetals bid has not been the subject of
scholarly inquiry. I hope to offer a beginning point for discussion by
exploring certain issues arising from the proposed transaction. As such,
this article proceeds in three parts. The first provides the landscape of
to a Chinese Company’s Bid to Buy Unocal is Not Only Hysterical, It’s Foolhardy”
The Toronto Star (3 July 2005) A18.
19 The former Liberal government subsequently introduced Bill C-59, which would
explicitly allow issues of national security to form part of the foreign investment
review process. See Bill C-59, An Act to Amend the Investment Canada Act, 1st
Sess., 38th Parl., 2005. It should be noted that Minister David Emerson stated the
Minmetals bid did not motivate the Bill’s introduction. Rather, it was designed in
light of “post-9/11 concerns about transfers of sensitive technology and military
hardware.” See Steven Chase & Simon Tuck, “National Security Bill Not Aimed at
Energy Takeovers: Emerson” The Globe and Mail (15 July 2005) B1. Although the
Bill died with the fall of the former Liberal government, the Conservative govern-
ment recently indicated that similar legislation is currently being crafted. See Simon
Tuck & Steven Chase, “Feds Eye New Hand on Foreign Ownership” The Globe and
Mail (15 May 2006) B1.
20 Lohr, supra, n. 18.
21 R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.) [ICA].
22 Simon Tuck & Wendy Stueck, “Ottawa to Eye Rights Records in Takeovers” The
Globe and Mail (8 October 2004) B3.
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the Canadian foreign investment review process by discussing its recent
historical background and delineating the mechanics of a proposed for-
eign investment. Following this is an overview of the human rights issues
germane to Minmetals and the resulting public discourse. A puzzling
disconnect between the rhetoric and the reality is revealed. Namely,
despite the federal government’s overtures, it appears that it actually has
no legal basis for integrating human rights issues into the foreign in-
vestment review process. Further, while Noranda publicly defended the
proposed bid and was dismissive of the broader context at issue, it will
be argued that this position was unfortunate and merits reconsideration.
In that regard, the balance of this article attempts to situate the Noranda-
Minmetals conundrum within the context of directors’ duties owed to
the corporation. In particular, employing a progressive construction of
the fiduciary duty and the duty of care, it is suggested that the preferred
approach would have been for Noranda’s board to have incorporated the
human rights concerns into its consideration of the proposed bid and
any actual bid that may have followed.
2. OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT LAW
(a) Recent Historical Background
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Pearson and Trudeau gov-
ernments pursued protectionist policies aimed at regulating foreign in-
vestment. Set against the backdrop of a forceful nationalist stance,23 the
Foreign Investment Review Act,24 which came into force in December
1973, was the first piece of legislation generally applicable to foreign
investment in Canada.25 FIRA served to subordinate the promotion of
foreign investment “to the achievement of national economic policy
objectives.”26 The legislation required foreign investors to apply to the
Foreign Investment Review Agency (“the Agency”), which was de-
23 M. Jacqueline Sheppard & Mungo Hardwicke-Brown, “Overview of the Investment
Canada Act with a Focus on Investments in Canada’s Upstream Oil and GasIndustry”
(1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 4 at 8.
24 S.C. 1973-74, c. 46 [FIRA].
25 Sheppard & Hardwicke-Brown, supra, n. 23 at 7.
26 Robert K. Paterson & Martine M.N. Band, International Trade and Investment Law
in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 10-10.
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signed to provide close scrutiny of proposed foreign investments to
ensure they would yield tangible domestic economic benefits.27 Indeed,
in order to be permitted, the new investment or proposed takeover was
required to be of “significant benefit to Canada.”28 In the early 1980s,
the federal government’s desire to closely regulate and monitor the
economic activities of foreign investors in Canada continued to have
momentum.29 For example, in October 1980 it advanced the National
Energy Program (“NEP”), which sought to enhance local ownership in
the oil and gas sector.30 In furtherance of this goal, the Agency was
directed to thwart any takeover attempts by foreign oil businesses while
the NEP simultaneously exposed outside oil businesses to “massive
takeover attempts by Canadian capital.”31
The Canadian government’s austere approach resulted in friction
with countries such as the U.S. The U.S. Secretary of State objected to
Canadian requirements that American investors undertake to bank with
Canadian financial institutions, employ Canadian advertising companies
and accountants, transplant manufacturing operations to Canada etc.32
The friction, and proceedings commenced by the U.S. under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,33 resulted in a softened stance.34 But
27 A. Neil Campbell, “Canada” in Dennis Campbell, ed., International Protection of
Foreign Investment, vol. 1 (Salzburg: Yorkhill Law Publishing, 2005) at I/127.
28 FIRA, supra, n. 24, s. 2(1). The factors to be considered in determining if this standard
was met were enumerated in s. 2(2) of FIRA.
29 In a Winter pre-election speech, Prime Minister Trudeau remarked as follows:
We want to expand and strengthen FIRA, not weaken it. FIRA’s mandate will be broadened
to include the periodic review of all foreign firms of large size to assess the performance
of these companies in such areas as export promotion and research and development. FIRA
will also be required to publicize proposed foreign take-overs beyond a certain size once
they have been submitted to the Agency. This will encourage counter-offers from Canadian-
controlled interests. Most importantly, through government guarantees of bank loans, FIRA
will help provide financial assistance to Canadian companies that want to compete for
foreign take-overs or repatriate foreign ownership of assets.
Sheppard, supra, n. 23 at 9, citing Robert Donaldson, & Craig Thorburn, “Foreign
Investment in the 1990’s in Canada. The Investment Canada Act” (Address to
Insight Seminar, 18 May 1989) at 16 [Donaldson & Thorburn].
30 Ibid., at 8.
31 Ibid., at 10.
32 Ibid., at 11, citing Donaldson & Thorburn at 20.
33 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can T.S. 1947 No. 27 (entered into force 1
January 1948).
34 Sheppard & Hardwicke-Brown, supra, n. 23 at 11 – 12.
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by 1982, it was clear that the FIRA review process, and other initiatives
perceived as being hostile to foreign investors, had alienated various
foreign governments and foreign companies in the oil and gas industry.35
The pendulum swung the other way, however, beginning in the
mid 1980s with the election of the Mulroney government. True to its
campaign platform,36 the Progressive Conservative party acted quickly
to implement a more liberalized investment and trade regime.37 The new
climate of deregulation and investment promotion, which reflected
broader trends and the globalization of international markets, gave rise
to the new ICA.38 The philosophy underlying the new legislation repre-
sented a significant departure from its predecessor. FIRA explicitly pro-
vided as follows:
. . .the extent to which control of Canadian industry, trade and commerce has
become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the effect thereof on the
ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over their economic environ-
ment is a matter of national concern. . .39
In sharp contrast, the purpose of the ICA is expressed as follows:
Recognizing that increased capital and technology would benefit Canada, the
purpose of this Act is to encourage investment in Canada by Canadians and non-
Canadians that contributes to economic growth and employment opportunities
and to provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by non-
Canadians in order to ensure such benefit to Canada.40
While the new legislation maintained a review process (discussed
below), the prior austere review was abandoned in favour of a “net
benefit” standard (rather than the more onerous “significant benefit”
standard).41 The liberalization of the foreign investment climate was
subsequently enhanced by the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement42
35 Ibid., at 12.
36 Ibid.
37 Sheppard & Hardwicke-Brown, supra, n. 23 at 11-5 – 11-6. As stated by the Minister
of Finance at an International Monetary Fund meeting, “Canada’s ‘welcome mat’ is
out once more for foreign investment – Canada is a good place to do business; we
are opening our doors to those who want to share in the tremendous opportunities
with which we have been endowed.” See Sheppard & Hardwicke-Brown, supra, n.
23 at 13, citing Donaldson & Thorburn at 23.
38 ICA, supra, n. 21.
39 FIRA, supra, n. 24, s. 2(1).
40 ICA, supra, n. 21, s. 2.
41 Campbell, supra, n. 27 at I/128. This standard is discussed in more detail below.
42 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3, 27 I.L.M. 281 (Part A, Schedule to the
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and the North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government
of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United
States.43 Correspondingly, FDI into Canada increased dramatically from
CND$131 billion in 1990 to CND$349 billion in 2002.44
(b) The Mechanics of a Proposed Foreign Investment
Subject to certain exemptions,45 if a non-Canadian investor46 (such
as Minmetals) proposes to acquire control of a Canadian business47 (such
as Noranda) it must give notice to the Director of Investments and
provide the prescribed information.48 Certain proposed investments are
considered reviewable under the ICA, thus requiring ministerial approval
before they can be implemented. As mentioned above, in order to extend
approval, the Minister must be satisfied that the proposed investment
“is likely to be of net benefit to Canada.”49 To be considered reviewable,
the asset value of the acquired Canadian business must meet or exceed
a certain monetary threshold. By increasing the applicable threshold, the
ICA has had the effect of decreasing the number of reviewable transac-
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 65;
entered into force 1 January 1989).
43 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January
1994).
44 Campbell, supra, n. 27 at I/127.
45 See ICA, supra, n. 21, s. 10.
46 The definition of “Canadian” is set out in the legislation as follows:
“Canadian” means
(a) a Canadian citizen,
(b) a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act who has been ordinarily resident in Canada for not more than one year after the
time at which he or she first became eligible to apply for Canadian citizenship,
(c) a Canadian government, whether federal, provincial or local, or an agency thereof,
or
(d) an entity that is Canadian-controlled, as determined pursuant to subsection 26(1) or
(2) and in respect of which no determination or declaration has been made under
subsection 26(2.1) or (2.2). . .
Ibid., s. 3.
47 The rules pertaining to acquisition of control are set out in s. 28 of the ICA. While
somewhat intricate, they “basically involve presumptions that a voting interest of
greater than 50 per cent constitutes control, a voting interest of less than 33.33 per
cent does not constitute control and, in between these levels, control will exist unless
it can be established that control in fact has not been obtained.” See Campbell, supra,
n. 27 at I/129.
48 ICA, supra, n. 21, ss. 11, 12.
49 Ibid., s. 21(1).
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tions as compared with FIRA.50 For direct investments, the threshold is
currently CND$5 million; for indirect investments, it is CND$50 mil-
lion.51 However, non-Canadian investors from World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”) member countries52 (such as China) benefit from a higher
threshold for direct acquisitions.53 For these investors, the threshold is
calculated annually using a statutorily prescribed formula and is pub-
lished in the Canada Gazette.54 For 2006, the amount is CND$265
million.55 As mentioned above, the proposed Minmetals bid would have
been valued at over US$7 billion and therefore would have qualified as
a reviewable transaction.
In order to determine whether the proposed investment meets the
“net benefit to Canada” standard, the ICA delineates six analytical factors
that the Minister is to take into account:
For the purposes of section 21, the factors to be taken into account, where relevant, are
(a) the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in
Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect
on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, compo-
nents and services produced in Canada and on exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the Canadian
business or new Canadian business and in any industry or industries in Canada
of which the Canadian business or new Canadian business forms or would
form a part;
(c) the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technolog-
ical development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or industries
in Canada;
50 Sheppard & Hardwicke-Brown, supra, n. 23 at 11-7.
51 ICA, supra, n. 21, ss. 14(3), 14(4).
52 For the definition of “WTO Investor”, see ibid., s. 14.1(6).
53 Ibid., s. 14.1(1). Under s. 14.1(4), indirect acquisitions by WTO member investors
are not reviewable.
54 Ibid., ss. 14.1(2), 14.1(3).
55 Amount for the year 2006, Can. Gaz. Pt. I, p. 132 (January 21, 2006). It should be
noted that the threshold of CND$5 million for direct investments and CND$50
million for indirect investments is applicable, regardless of the investor’s nationality,
if the proposed investor would acquire control of a Canadian business in one of four
sectors (uranium production, financial services, transportation services and cultural
businesses). See ibid., s. 14.1(5). Further, the federal government has the discretion
to conduct reviews of proposed investments that would not otherwise be reviewable
if the investment “is related to Canada’s cultural heritage or national identity.” See
ibid., s. 15(a).
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(e) the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and
cultural policies, taking into consideration industrial, economic and cultural
policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province
likely to be significantly affected by the investment; and
(f) the contribution of the investment to Canada’s ability to compete in world
markets.56
It has been noted that employment is a factor that is typically assigned
much weight in the review process; in particular, if it is expected that
the proposed investment will result in the loss of significant employment
in regions of the country that are economically weak. Other factors of
significance include research and development activity, capital invest-
ments, local managerial autonomy and local head offices.57 The acquir-
ing investor will sometimes be required to submit undertakings to the
Minister to ensure the “net benefit” factors are met. For example, to
secure approval of its acquisition of Canadian retailer Woolco, Wal-
Mart undertook to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to use “Ca-
nadian-based suppliers.”58 The merits of the Minister’s decision do not
appear to be subject to judicial scrutiny.59
3. DISCOURSE ON THE PROPOSED NORANDA
TAKEOVER
(a) Human Rights Issues Associated with Minmetals
The impugned conduct of Minmetals relates to the issue of forced
labour. In 1997, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (“the
Committee”) heard evidence which detailed the common process in
56 Ibid., s. 20. In its Guidelines, Industry Canada has said the following with respect to
the “net benefit” standard:
In reaching a decision, judgments will be made both in measuring the effects of a proposal
in relation to the relevant individual factors of assessment and in measuring the aggregate
net effect after offsetting the negative effects, if any, against the positive ones. An investment
will be determined to be of net benefit when the aggregate net effect is positive, regardless
of its extent.
“All Guidelines,” online: Industry Canada http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/
inica-lic.nsf/en/lk00064e.html.
57 Campbell, supra, n. 27 at I/131.
58 Jean-Gabriel Castel et al., The Canadian Law and Practice of International Trade,
2nd ed. (Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 1997) at 624, citing “Wal-Mart Vows To
Sell Canadian Talent, Goods” The Toronto Star (3 August 1994) 3.
59 Ibid., at 624, citing Baril v. Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion, [1986] 1 F.C.
328.
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China of: (1) sentencing convicted prisoners to “reform” via labour (i.e.,
prison labour); or (2) sentencing those who have not been criminally
convicted but have committed minor offences to “reeducation” via la-
bour (i.e., forced labour camps).60 With respect to the latter, leading non-
governmental organization Human Rights Watch has decried the prac-
tice of reeducation through labour as being in contravention of
international human rights law, given that the process is arbitrary, in-
volves no judicial authority, does not involve a public trial, does not
allow the individual to raise any defence, does not afford a right to
counsel and does not incorporate a presumption of innocence. Further,
such sanctions are used to incarcerate religious and political dissidents
and often the term of detention is extended even after the individual’s
sentence has expired.61
In his testimony before the Committee, Chinese dissident Harry
Wu cited information estimating that approximately 1.78 million people
were held in reeducation through labour camps at the time.62 Wu himself
spent 19 years in various Chinese camps as a political prisoner.63 He was
subjected to both forced labour and various forms of torture before being
released and eventually entering the U.S. in 1996 as a visiting professor
at the University of California, Berkeley.64 With respect to Minmetals
specifically, Wu referenced evidence from California litigation involv-
ing a U.S. company called Excel Industries (“Excel”) and MM Rotors
(“MM”), one of Minmetals’ U.S.-based subsidiaries. MM manufactured
brake rotors and Excel was a purchaser. In the litigation, an Excel official
testified that he personally visited the relevant manufacturing plant in
China and that it was, in fact, a prison factory. He was advised that
Minmetals was purchasing the majority of brake components produced
by the facility.65 Thus, although Minmetals does not directly run these
60 U.S., United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Implementation
of Prison Labor Agreements with China (S. HRG. 105-253) (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1997) at 1.
61
“Reeducation through Labor in China,” online: Human Rights Watch http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/china-98/laojiao.htm.
62 U.S., supra, n. 60 at 44.
63 Harry Wu, “Canadians Must Ask Hard Questions of Minmetals” The Globe and
Mail (29 October 2004) A23.
64
“Denounce Torture Speakers List,” online: Amnesty International USA http://
www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/speakers list.html.
65 U.S., supra, n. 60 at 50.
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camps, the allegation is that it is “part of the network that markets [forced
labour] products overseas, acts as trading agents for the [forced labour
system], and serves as a reliable partner in keeping the system hidden
and profitable.”66 As put by English journalist Nick Rufford with respect
to another Chinese camp:
As with China’s other labour camps, the authorities disguise the mine’s penal
use. Graphite is sold exclusively through Minmetals, a profitable, state-run for-
eign-trade corporation, though the prison is run by the Shandong bureau of labour
reform. The mine earns at least £2-million each year in foreign exchange. Last
November, delegates from Minmetals visited Britain and Germany to build on
their sales and to seek new customers.67
(b) Considering Non-economic Factors in the Foreign
Investment Review Process
On October 8, 2004, the Globe and Mail reported that former
Industry Minister David Emerson said he would “look at human rights
concerns” if called upon to assess the proposed takeover of Noranda.68
He also suggested he would consider the human rights records of poten-
tial acquirers when assessing any future foreign takeovers. Emerson,
however, stopped short of endorsing the inclusion of human rights in
the enumerated “net benefit” factors, suggesting that this “would set a
thorny precedent because it could lead to a host of new behavioural
tests.”69 While none of the factors expressly mention human rights, an
Industry Canada official was reported as suggesting that such concerns
could be validly considered given that “approval for a foreign takeover
is at the discretion of the minister.”70 Further, while former Prime Min-
ister Paul Martin welcomed the bid for Noranda, he similarly stated that
human rights concerns would be taken into account.71
In reality, however, it is highly unlikely that human rights consid-
erations could have lawfully formed part of the Minister’s decision-
making process. As noted by Paterson and Band, the s. 21 factors are
seemingly exhaustive and it is presumed that the Minister is not able to
66 Wu, supra, n. 63.
67 Ibid.
68 Tuck & Stueck, supra, n. 22.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Brian Laghi, “PM Lauds Chinese Takeover of Noranda” The Globe and Mail (22
October 2004) A1.
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consider any additional factors.72 Thus, as posited by the Conference
Board of Canada, it is not possible for foreign investors to be blocked
as a result of non-economic grounds.73 Martin and Emerson were there-
fore either being disingenuous, or were simply ill-informed as to the
correct interpretation of the legislation. Whichever the case, this raises
a pressing set of normative questions. Should the criteria by which
foreign buyers are judged be broadened to incorporate non-economic
factors? Should the human rights record of foreign buyers be taken into
consideration? According to one critic, to do so would result in “absurd
situations” where Canada might, for example, be inclined to thwart
future American takeovers due to the moral and legal questionability of
Bush’s invasion of Iraq.74
(c) The Public Debate
While the purview of the foreign investment review process is
beyond the scope of this article, the purview of directors’ duties to the
corporation as they apply to the situation will be discussed. Before doing
so, it is useful to have a sense of the fascinating public debate produced
by Minmetals’ proposed acquisition. Human rights activists, labour lead-
ers and academics cited the Chinese government’s dismal human rights
record and its authoritarian control over virtually all institutions, includ-
ing the judiciary, government organs and the media.75 For these groups,
countries like Canada have a role to play in “encouraging” China to
undertake democratic reform through sanction. As argued by one com-
mentator “a price should be paid for clinging to the authoritarian
faith. . .[t]he leadership of China must realize that it cannot enjoy full
participation in free economies and open societies until it becomes one,
too. As a state-owned agency of an authoritarian government, China
72 Paterson & Band, supra, n. 26 at 11-24, n. 135.
73 Conference Board of Canada, “Should Canada Update Its Foreign Investment
Rules?” Executive Action (November 2004) at 4 (noting, however, “the exception
of investors in sectors such as telecom, media and culture, where there are caps on
the percentage of foreign ownership. . .”).
74 Eric Reguly, “Outcry Over Noranda Buyer Rings Hollow” The Globe and Mail (2
October 2004) B2.
75 Thomas Axworthy, “Don’t Let Deals Devour Democracy” The Globe and Mail (18
October 2004) A15.
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Minmetals should not be allowed to own the assets of our free society
until China itself joins the community of the free.”76
In response, some interventions were based on the belief that the
adoption of democratic norms can only take place with increased ex-
posure to Western values and structures. In other words, the use of
economic liberty as a vehicle for the achievement of political liberty.77
Others reflected a neoliberal economic ideology of unregulated invest-
ment and heightened business autonomy. These commentators argued
that thwarting the deal would result in severe economic risks and would
prevent Canada from rising back to the top of the FDI ladder.78 Indeed,
with foreign companies becoming more interested in emerging markets
such as India, Mexico and China, there have been recent concerns about
the level of FDI that Canada is attracting.79 By way of illustration,
consulting firm A.T. Kearney Inc. publishes an annual “FDI Confidence
Index” which ranks the 25 most attractive destinations for FDI. While
Canada placed 8th in 2002,80 it dropped to 21st in 2005.81 For these
commentators, the issue of Minmetals’ labour practices was moot. With
respect to practices in Canada, if the takeover proceeded the company
would be bound by Canadian labour laws. As with Canadian businesses,
non-Canadian investors must comply with all applicable provincial and
federal laws. This includes non-derogable minimum standards relating
to conditions and terms of employment, such as hours of work, wages,
overtime remuneration and working conditions.82 With respect to prac-
tices in China, it was argued that our society should leave such issues to
specialized bodies like the International Labour Organization.83
The calls for caution were not limited to those on the left. Colum-
nists Peter Foster and Terence Corcoran, normally staunch proponents
76 Ibid.
77 Reguly, supra, n. 74.
78 John D. Wiebe, “Why would we Slam the Door on China?” The National Post (7
October 2004) FP11.
79 Rob Ferguson, “Canada Losing Ground in Foreign Investment” The Toronto Star
(18 September 2003) C.01.
80 Ibid.
81 Global Business Policy Council, “2005 Foreign Direct Investment Confidence In-
dex,” online: A.T. Kearney Inc. http://atkearney.com/main.taf?p5,3,1,140,1.
82 Campbell, supra, n. 27 at I/133.
83 Wiebe, supra, n. 78.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 91
of free markets, vehemently objected to the proposed deal.84 Corcoran’s
hesitation was rooted primarily in business considerations. He argued,
among other things, that Minmetals would bring no degree of particular
expertise to Noranda’s global operations and that the resulting combi-
nation would yield no competitive advantages in terms of creating mar-
ket efficiencies.85 However, he also issued one of the most searing
indictments based on moral grounds:
OK, Noranda shareholders might get a premium on their shares and make off
with a nifty profit; so probably did the German steel mills when they struck cozy
arrangements with Hitler.
. . .
. . . there’s the moral issue of selling through market systems to a government
that is still essentially totalitarian in its style and outlook. It is not a democracy,
it has no serious property rights, no recognizable human rights, no economic
freedom. In fact, China’s economic record – despite the progress made to date –
is one of economic repression.
Maybe there’s nothing Ottawa can do. But there is too much going on there to
justify silence on the part of Canadians. Above all, we cannot continue to treat
this story the way we have – as just another corporate takeover between free –
enterprise nations. It is not.86
What then of those closest to the proposed deal? Rather than con-
structively engaging the hesitations of government officials, civil society
etc., Noranda adamantly defended the proposed sale. Other than painting
a picture of Minmetals as a well-intentioned corporate citizen, it gave
no indication that it would seriously incorporate the human rights con-
cerns into its consideration of the proposed bid and/or any actual bid
that may have ensued.87 Quite the opposite, company executives in fact
“expressed. . .disappointment [that]. . .criticism has centred on the rights
issue, and ignored the economic opportunity”88 and went so far as to
84 See, for example, Peter Foster, “Canadian Bull in the China Shop” The National
Post (8 October 2004) FP15.
85 Terence Corcoran, “Someone Must Stop this Deal: Is the Premium Worth the Price?”
The National Post (28 September 2004) FP1.
86 Ibid. Arguably objections from these quarters are not surprising. While they are in
part informed by rights-based considerations, they also demonstrate the classical
neoliberal rejection of communism: “Mr. Wiebe also suggests we might send out
the wrong “signals.” But surely only to other communist countries who want to take
over Canadian assets.” See Foster, supra, n. 84.
87 Drew Hasselback & Paul Vieira, “Noranda Defends China Sale” The National
Post (7 October 2004) FP1.
88 Ibid.
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state that the proposed bid was being “exploited” by activists such as
Wu.89
4. THE PROPOSED TAKEOVER IN THE CONTEXT OF
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
(a) Framing the Issue
The commentary of participants in the debate such as Corcoran
seems to impose a dichotomy between the economic dimensions of the
proposed transaction and the human rights dimensions. Noranda appears
to have implicitly adopted this myopic view by failing to view the latter
as relevant to its decision-making process. However, the two dimensions
are not necessarily severable. Rather than seeing the issue as “it would
not have been an economically advantageous takeover and, in addition,
it would have been unethical” or “it would have been an economically
advantageous takeover and the human rights aspects are irrelevant,” the
issue could also have been framed as “it may not have been an econom-
ically advantageous merger because of the human rights-related as-
pects.” In other words, could Minmetals’ complicity in rights-violating
activities have had a detrimental impact on Noranda’s bottom line and
thus on its shareholders? Putting the whole ICA review process aside,
in considering the proposed takeover, and any actual bid that may have
followed, should Noranda’s directors have considered Minmetals’ hu-
man rights record in accordance with their prescribed duties? This issue
engages two legal duties that Canadian directors and officers are subject
to, which impose upon them certain standards of behaviour. Both were
developed at common law and are now codified by statute. Specifically,
the duty to “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests
of the corporation”90 (i.e., the fiduciary duty) and the duty to “exercise
the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances” (i.e., the duty of care).91
89 Peter O’Neil, “Noranda’s Suitor Cited in Labour Case” The National Post (5 October
2004) A8.
90 Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 134(1)(a) [OBCA].
91 Ibid., s. 134(1)(b). While the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-44 contains parallel statutory provisions, reference is being made to the OBCA





With respect to the fiduciary duty, the precise normative content
of the phrase “best interests of the corporation” has been the subject of
judicial and academic debate and engages one of the most interesting
aspects of corporate law theory. To whom exactly is this duty owed? In
discharging this duty to “the corporation”, is it appropriate to consider
the positions of non-shareholder stakeholders? For example, should
Noranda’s directors have assessed the potential impact of the acquisition
on the company’s suppliers, creditors, employees and the broader com-
munity?
In the 1930s, this issue was famously debated by Professors Berle
and Dodd. For the former, corporate powers were held in trust for the
shareholders exclusively.92 This view forms the basis for the contractar-
ian or shareholder primacy model of the corporation.93 For the latter,
managerial powers were held in trust for the entire community and not
just for shareholders: “[p]ublic opinion, which ultimately makes law,
has made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a
view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has
a social service as well as a profit-making function. . . .”94 This serves
as the basis for what has been referred to as the communitarian or social
entity model of the corporation.95 The debate is as relevant now as it was
in the 1930s. In 2001, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman declared the
“[e]nd of [h]istory for [c]orporate [l]aw,” arguing “the triumph” and
92 Adolph A. Berle, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harvard L. Rev.
1049 at 1049.
93 In his influential essay ‘‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits,’’ economist Milton Friedman argued that ‘‘there is one and only one social
responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition without deception and fraud.” See Milton
Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits” The New
York Times Magazine (13 September 1970) at 122–26.
94 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45
Harvard L. Rev. 1145 at 1148.
95 These theoretical models have been the subject of much academic commentary. For
an excellent overview of their fundamental tenants, see William T. Allen, “Our
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation” (1992) 14 Cardozo L. Rev.
261 at 264.
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“ideological hegemony” of the shareholder primacy model.96 While this
model has, without doubt, functioned as the dominant paradigm in mod-
ern corporate law, its dominance in Canada was recently thrown into
question by the Supreme Court of Canada in People’s Department Stores
Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re.97 While the decision leaves various issues unresol-
ved respecting the scope of directors’ duties,98 scholars have commented
on the Court’s noteworthy rejection of the shareholder primacy model,99
given its following pronouncement:
[I]t is clear that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be read
not simply as the “best interests of the shareholders” [. . .] [I]n determining
whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may
be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors
to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, credi-
tors, consumers, governments and the environment.100
This aspect of the ruling departs from prior jurisprudence that
interpreted the “best interests of the corporation” as being synonymous
with maximizing shareholder return.101 But notwithstanding this, the
issue can also be considered in light of traditional discourse. Indeed, in
the context of takeover bids, the “best interests of the corporation” at
least entails a duty to seek the best value that was reasonably available
to shareholders in the circumstances. Accepting this premise, if Min-
metals’ complicity in rights-violating activities could have had a detri-
mental impact on the return of Noranda’s shareholders, would not the
directors’ fiduciary duty have obligated them to at least consider this
complicity in assessing the proposed takeover bid and any actual bid
that may have followed? If it was not considered, can it be said that the
directors really attempted to gather the best information available to
96 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law”
(2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 439 at 468.
97 People’s Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, REJB 2004-
72160, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, 2004 CarswellQue 2862, 2004 CarswellQue 2863, (sub
nom. Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise) 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564,
(sub nom. Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Bankrupt) v. Wise) 326 N.R. 267 (Eng.),
326 N.R. 267 (Fr.), 4 C.B.R. (5th) 215, 49 B.L.R. (3d) 165, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples].
98 Janis Sarra, “Class Act: Considering Race and Gender in the Corporate Boardroom”
(2005) 79 St. John’s L. Rev. 1121 at 1139.
99 Ian Lee, “Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and the ‘Best Interests of the Corpo-
ration’” (2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 212.
100 Peoples, supra, n. 97 at para. 42 [S.C.R.].
101 Sarra, supra, n. 98, citing various Ontario and Saskatchewan decisions.
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them in deciding on a particular course of action vis-a`-vis the proposed
bid? In other words, linked with the duty of care standard discussed
below, if the directors were not willing to even entertain the issue, much
less follow up with a degree of inquiry/investigation, how could they be
reasonably certain that pursuing the chosen course of action would
actually result in value maximization? Is it possible that a different
strategy may have been adopted had the issue been considered (for
example, canvassing the market to determine if other, more suitable,
bidders existed)?
Studies have certainly identified a positive relationship between
socially responsible corporate behaviour and financial success, in par-
ticular with respect to share value.102 For example, businesses with eth-
ically sound environmental policies enjoy less share value volatility than
those without103 and organizations “with a serious commitment to ethical
behavior outperform those without such a commitment over the long
term.”104 Unfortunately, this is of limited assistance in addressing
whether the fiduciary duty of Noranda’s directors would have obligated
them to consider Minmetals’ human rights record. As noted by Professor
Anand et. al., courts have interpreted the directors’ fiduciary duty to
mean that decisions can serve either the short or long-term interests of
shareholders. Thus, even if a particular course of action will have a
positive economic impact for shareholders in future, but not immedi-
ately, the course of action is permissible under the business judgment
rule (“BJR”).105 But even if this affords corporate management the ability
102 A. Riahi-Belkaoui, “Organizational Effectiveness, Social Performance and Eco-
nomic Performance” in J. E. Post, ed., vol. 12, Research In Corporate Social
Performance And Policy (1991) 143 at 152.
103 Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, “Is there an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?” (2005) 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 75 at 94, citing Pratima Bansal
& Iain Clelland, “Talking Trash: Legitimacy, Impression Management, and Unsys-
tematic Risk in the Context of the Natural Environment” (2004) 47 Acad. Mgmt. J.
93 at 100-01.
104 Ibid., citing Alison Maitland, “Profits from the Righteous Path” The Financial Times
(3 April 2003) 13 (citing study by U.K. Institute for Business Ethics).
105 Anita Anand & Jessica Penley, Book Review of The Corporation: The Pathological
Pursuit of Profit and Power by Joel Bakan (2005) Queen’s L.J. 943. The content
and application of the BJR is a somewhat nuanced issue. At a general level, it is
understood as the principle that courts should afford deference to the business
decisions of corporate directors and officers. See Peoples, supra, n. 97 at para. 64
[S.C.R.].
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to incorporate human rights-related considerations into its decision-
making processes, it does not obligate them to do so. Even accepting
the financial value of doing so in the long-term, such a course of action
could prove costly in the short-term. As such, under the BJR, manage-
ment could simply decide to avoid costly endeavours such as establish-
ing a board committee on human rights, or adopting a human rights
policy and accompanying monitoring mechanisms, in favour of effecting
an immediate return for its equity holders in the form of dividends or
enhanced share value. This, of course, would also be in the directors’
own interests given a North American corporate culture that links short-
term profits with the earnings and bonus structures of corporate execu-
tives.106
Most importantly though, this discussion is moot since Minmetals
was proposing a 100 percent buy-out of Noranda. In other words, con-
cerns relating to long-term economic performance would not have been
an issue for Noranda’s existing shareholders at the time of the proposed
bid, since they would no longer be in the picture after any successful
takeover. Despite this, however, there is arguably still room to assert
that the fiduciary duty may have compelled Noranda’s directors to assess
Minmetals’ human rights record. For example, as public scrutiny height-
ened, if all signs indicated that the board was considering the deal in a
contextual vacuum, what effect would this have had on the return of
Noranda’s shareholders during the board’s consideration process and
the subsequent foreign investment review process? Could the association
with Minmetals – without clear indications that the relevant human rights
issues were “on the radar” – have produced a negative economic result?
If so, would any such result have continued if, for example, the takeover
ended up falling through?
As recently noted by Professors Williams and Conley, allegations
of corporate linkages to human rights abuses can pose serious risks to
business reputation, regardless of whether there is an actual finding of
106 Janis Sarra, “Corporate Social Responsibility in the Global Economy: Canadian
Domestic Law and Legal Processes as a Vehicle for Creating and Enforcing Inter-
national Norms” in Patricia Hughes & Patrich A. Molinari, eds., Participatory
Justice in a Global Economy: The New Rule of Law (Montreal: Les E´ ditions The´mis,
2004) 333 at 348.
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legal liability.107 Citing studies that have employed qualitative and quan-
titative research methods to explore business operations’ legal compli-
ance, the authors note that the decisions of top management in particular
operations are informed not just by the threat of legal enforcement/
sanction, but also by “the ‘enforcement’ of various social actors such as
investors, NGOs, consumers, and community members reacting to in-
formation about companies and the companies’ reputations.”108 In light
of potential detrimental economic repercussions to shareholders, they
conclude that “well-counseled board members are increasinglyattending
to the underlying conditions in efforts to assess and mitigate those
risks.”109
Similarly, SustainAbility Ltd., an international strategy consul-
tancy and independent think-tank, produced a 2004 report titled “The
Changing Landscape of Liability: A Director’s Guide to Trends in Cor-
porate Environmental, Social and Economic Liability.” Significant
among its recommendations is a call for corporations to move away
from passive responsibility, in favour of active responsibility, in order
to best mitigate risk to shareholder value from society’s increasing ex-
pectations of environmental, social, and economic responsibility. Ac-
cording to the report, “[t]he greater the damage companies are perceived
to have caused, the greater the business loss that can occur—making
moral liability . . . one of the most significant areas for concern.”110
Examples cited include a decrease in Nike’s share value as a result of
allegations that it benefited from child labour and a decrease in sales for
Shell as a result of its controversial activities in the Nigerian Delta (inter
107 Williams & Conley, supra, n. 103 at 93.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 SustainAbility Ltd., The Changing Landscape of Liability: A Director’s Guide to
Trends in Corporate Environmental, Social and Economic Liability (2004) at 16.
The report further provides as follows:
In our view, moral liability arises when a company violates stakeholder expectations of
ethical behaviour in such a way as to put business value at risk. Societal expectations of
responsible business behaviour are broad and often fast evolving, spanning norms of fair-
ness, honesty, promise-keeping, respect for rights, and due care to protect the interests of
people and the natural world. Breaches of basic ethical norms can seriously undermine
critical business assets, including the trust and loyalty of customers, the pride and advocacy
of employees, and the confidence of shareholders in the probity of management.
Ibid.
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alia, Shell was accused of involvement in the executions of activists
protesting the company’s environmental and development policies in
Nigeria).111
Further, a recent legal analysis of trustees’ obligations in the context
of the investment industry is of assistance. As with directors and officers
who owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation, the concept of fidu-
ciary law is the primary limitation on trustees’ decision-making discre-
tion. Also similar to directors and officers, it is generally accepted that
the primary responsibility of trustees is to guarantee the financial return
of their beneficiaries.112 In 2005, the international law firm Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer (“Freshfields’) produced a study at the request of
the Asset Management Working Group of the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme Finance Initiative (“UNEPFI”). The report considers
the fiduciary duties of trustees with respect to institutional investment
funds (e.g., public/private pension funds and mutual funds). In particu-
lar, the UNEPFI asked Freshfields to determine whether incorporating
environmental, social, governance and ethical factors (“ESG”) into in-
vestment decision-making (e.g., portfolio construction, asset allocation,
stock-picking) is “voluntarily permitted, legally required or hampered
by law and regulation.”113 In reviewing seven major jurisdictions (both
common and civil law), the report concluded as follows:
One element of the law governing investment decision-making that is common
to all the jurisdictions is the requirement that decision-makers follow the correct
process in reaching their decisions. . .Conforming with the correct process re-
quires decision-makers to have regard to all considerations relevant to the deci-
sion, including those that impact upon value. In our view, decision-makers are
required to have regard (at some level) to ESG considerations in every decision
they make. This is because there is a body of credible evidence demonstrating
that such considerations often have a role to play in the proper analysis of in-
vestment value. As such they cannot be ignored, because doing so may result in
investments being given an inappropriate value.
. . .
111 Ibid.
112 Ruth V. Aguilera et al., “Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Com-
parative Analysis of the UK and the US” (2006) 14 Corp. Governance: An Int’l
Rev. 147 at 155.
113 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, A Legal Framework for the Integration of Envi-
ronmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment (October
2005) at 6.
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. . . the links between ESG factors and financial performance are increasingly
being recognised. On that basis, integrating ESG considerations into an invest-
ment analysis so as to more reliably predict financial performance is clearly
permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions.114
In light of the above, it can be argued that an assessment of Min-
metals’ complicity in rights-violating activities would not just have been
of benefit over the long-term. Rather, given the level of discourse and
debate received by the proposed acquisition (even though a formal bid
did not materialize and the investment review process was not engaged),
it is likely that serious scrutiny would have continued, intensified and
further mobilized stakeholders such as consumers, communitymembers,
activists etc. Indeed, even at the preliminary stage there were calls for
public hearings into whether Canada should maintain an investment
review process that would allow such an acquisition to proceed.115
In that regard, the situation is analogous to that of Calgary-based
Talisman Energy which previously ran its operations in Sudan and, in
particular, in the context of the Sudanese civil war. Among other things,
it was alleged that government forces and their allies took advantage of
Talisman’s oil facilities for rights-abusing activities and that the same
forces enhanced security for Talisman’s business operations.116 While
vehemently denied by Talisman, allegations such as these sparked a
huge controversy. Human rights groups protested and mounted a di-
vestment campaign. Shareholders demanded the board assure them that
the company was not aiding the Sudanese government in the civil war
or in its repeated violations of international human rights law.117 In the
end, although there was no judicial finding of impropriety, the public
outcry had such an impact on Talisman’s reputation and immediate
bottom line that the company withdrew from Sudan in 2002. The vola-
114 Ibid., at 10, 11, 13 [emphasis in original].
115 The former Liberal majority of the House of Commons Industry Committee defeated
a motion to hold such public hearings. See Laghi, supra, n. 71.
116 See Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin & Penelope Simons, Deconstructing En-
gagement: Corporate Self-Regulation in Conflict Zones – Implications for Human
Rights and Canadian Public Policy (Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council & Law Commission of Canada, January 2003) at 3.
117 Aaron A. Dhir “Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals
as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability”
(2006) 43 Am. Bus. L. Jour. 365 at 388.
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tility of Talisman’s share price in 2000 was described by the Wall Street
Journal as follows:
Largely because of the Sudan cloud, Talisman’s stock languishes at only 10.3
times this year’s earnings as projected. . . Jonathan Wolff, an analyst with Dre-
sdner Kleinwort Benson in New York, says Talisman’s stock trades at a 6%
discount to net asset value, compared with a 20% premium before its Sudan
involvement.118
Indeed, before its withdrawal from Sudan, Talisman suffered from
a thirty-three percent decline in the value of its shares.119 In announcing
the withdrawal, CEO Jim Buckee stated that Talisman “could no longer
support the pressure its Sudan operations put on its resources and its
share price.”120
It is entirely conceivable that Noranda could have been similarly
situated. Further, it is noteworthy that taking stock of Minmetals’ human
rights record would, in fact, have been in harmony with the “Ethics &
Values” section of the company website, which provides that “every
business decision” is based on “an ethical standard” that, inter alia, takes
human rights issues into consideration. In addition, the company states:
118 Tamsin Carlisle, “For Canadian Firm, an African Albatross – Oil Driller Talisman
Energy Pays a Painful Price for its Sudan Investment” The Wall Street Journal (17
August 2000) A19.
119 William Baue, “Divesting from Genocide: A Conversation with Eric Reeves of the
Divest Sudan Campaign” (10 Decmeber 2004), online: Institutional Shareowner
http://www.institutionalshareowner.com/article.mpl?sfArticleId1587.
120 Lily Nguyen, “Talisman to Pull out of Sudan” The Globe and Mail (31 October
2002) A1. The Globe and Mail further reported as follows:
“It was time to turn the page,” [Buckee] said in a news conference about the $1.2-billion
sale of Talisman’s 25-per-cent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co. to India’s
Oil & Natural Gas Corp. . .
“We felt the controversy detracted. . .from the strength of our other assets,” Mr. Buckee
said.
“Every newspaper mention of Talisman was qualified under ‘involved in Sudan.’ We hope
to move on from that instant association.”
Critics who have dogged the company for over three years, urging a boycott of its shares,
hailed the announcement as a triumph both for human rights and social activism.
. . .
Eric Reeves, another prominent activist, said in an interview: “We have here an extraordi-
nary example of grassroots activism forcing a Fortune 500 company to withdraw from an
extremely lucrative venture, because that venture is immoral.”




“[w]e believe that the community, not the economy, is the starting point
of economic life. For a community to be sustained, all members must
be recognized and treated with respect – consumers, employees, share-
holders, the community at large and corporations.”121
(c) Duty of Care
While I have primarily situated this discussion within the context
of directors’ fiduciary duty, it could also be framed under the rubric of
the duty of care. Similar to the fiduciary duty, whether a director has
exercised the requisite “care, diligence and skill” in the circumstances
is not readily apparent. While no Canadian litigation has yet been pur-
sued, Professor Sarra has argued that “the duty of care could encompass
an obligation to ensure processes [are] in place for compliance with
human rights law and corporate codes of conduct.”122 In that regard, in
addition to the “Ethics & Values” section of the company website,
Falconbridge has adopted a formal code of ethics which provides the
following commitment under the category of “Respect Human Rights”:
“[w]e know that abuses of what we consider to be fundamental human
rights. . .are accepted in some parts of the world. While we do not believe
we can independently change this reality, we support the protection of
human rights within our sphere of influence and are not complicit in
human rights abuses.”123
Most important for present purposes are two statements made by
the Supreme Court in Peoples. First, the duty of care dictates a contextual
approach that “not only emphasizes the primary facts but also permits
prevailing socio-economic conditions to be taken into consideration.”124
Second, the decisions of directors and officers “must be reasonable
business decisions in light of all the circumstances about which the
directors or officers knew or ought to have known.”125 Both of these
statements would appear germane to the Noranda-Minmetals affair
given the considerations discussed above. With respect to the first, ex-
121
“Ethics & Values,” online: Falconbridge http://www.falconbridge.com/about
us/ethics values.htm.
122 Sarra, supra, n. 98 at 1140.
123
“Code of Ethics,” online: Falconbridgehttp://www.falconbridge.com/documents/
policies/Fal CodeofEthics Sep05.pdf [emphasis added].
124 Peoples, supra, n. 97 at para. 64 [S.C.R.].
125 Ibid., at para. 67.
102 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [22 B.F.L.R.]
pressly permitting directors to consider “prevailing socio-economic con-
ditions” is an important step forward, even if permissive rather than
obligatory. With respect to the second, the Court references a require-
ment that directors’ decisions be informed (i.e., that they be made in
light of all relevant circumstances). In the famous U.S. case of Smith v.
Van Gorkom,126 the Supreme Court of Delaware expressed this concept
in terms of directors making decisions by informing themselves of “all
material information reasonably available to them.”127 The Court found
the directors in breach of their duty of care, inter alia, because the
directors accepted a friendly takeover bid without considering all ma-
terial information. On the facts, this included information as pivotal as
documentation respecting the value of the corporation.128 This infor-
mation was considered so essential that the directors were found to have
met a standard of gross negligence129 and thus could not avail themselves
of the BJR’s protection. While factors such as the human rights record
of a potential buyer may not meet such a heightened standard now, it is
important to note the increasing importance such factors have taken on
(as demonstrated by the Freshfields report).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The issues considered in this article will continue to be relevant, in
particular given that China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stated the
Noranda bid was “the tip of the iceberg” with respect to Chinese in-
vestment in Canada.130 Indeed, after the Noranda-Minmetals talks began,
it was reported that China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec
Corp.) was consulting with Beijing about the possibility of direct in-
vestment in Alberta’s oil sands. Talks were also held between Sinopec
126 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
127 Ibid., at 872.
128 Ibid., at 874.
129 Ibid., at 881.
130 Laghi, supra, n. 71. The Foreign Minister explained:
Given our rapid economic growth, we’re facing an acute shortage of natural re-
sources. . .[n]o matter how plentiful our natural resources, when you divide them by our
population of 1.3 billion, the figure will be very small. . .[t]he Chinese government is
encouraging Chinese enterprises to make investments in Canada, particularly in the field
of resources exploitation.
See Geoffrey York, “China Set to Buy up Canada’s Resources” The Globe and
Mail (21 October 2004) A1.
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Corp. and pivotal oil sands players, including Shell Canada, Syncrude
and Suncor Energy.131
I have attempted to offer a beginning point for discussion. In par-
ticular, by exploring the Noranda-Minmetals conundrum within the con-
text of directors’ duties and arguing that a progressive construction of
the fiduciary duty and the duty of care suggest that Noranda’s board
should have incorporated human rights concerns into its consideration
of the proposed bid, and any actual bid that may have ensued. I recognize
that this progressive construction is somewhat aspirational. It is worth
noting, however, that other jurisdictions have recognized the application
of directors’ duties in the manner I have advocated. Consider the case
of Japan, with respect to its evolving understanding of fiduciary duty:
The Commercial Code of Japan establishes the fiduciary duty of directors, pur-
suant to which directors are responsible for constructing a risk control system
corresponding to the scale and characteristics of their business. For instance, if a
director of a Japanese corporation realized that an unfair labour practice occurred
in its foreign contract factory, which then attracted media attention and damaged
the corporation’s reputation or business, the director may be liable for damages
as a result of violating his fiduciary duty. The director could also be sued in a
shareholders representative suit. Although no such case exists in Japan, the re-
quired level of fiduciary duty is heightened as the complexity and specialization
in society progresses, and as the public consciousness regarding international
human rights improves. The above scenario is more realistic under current cir-
cumstances than it had been in the past.132
As stated in the Freshfields report “[l]ast century. . .fiduciary duties were
held to preclude local authorities from applying a standard minimum
wage for adult men and women and providing subsidised public trans-
port.”133 This reflects the fact that duties ascribed to directors, such as
the fiduciary duty, are organic in nature and “evolve over time to reflect
changing social norms and values.”134
Many difficult questions surrounding the Noranda-Minmetals af-
fair remain unanswered and underexplored. Should Canada’s foreign
investment review process be revised so as to specifically allow for the
131 Park, supra, n. 12. See also Eric Reguly, “It’s Time to Plan Ahead for China’s Big
Oil Sands Bid” The Globe and Mail (15 April 2006) B2.
132 Koji Ishikawa, “The Rise of the Code of Conduct in Japan: Legal Conduct and
Prospect” (2005) 27 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 101 at 112 - 113.
133 Freshfields, supra, n. 113 at 87, n. 350.
134 Ibid., at 87.
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consideration of non-economic factors? What are the implications of
revising this process so as to allow issues of national security to be
considered, as was contemplated by Bill C-59? In seeking to preclude
foreign investment from business operations that are implicated in
rights-violating activities, what standards do we use in judging which
activities are permissible and which are problematic? At a philosophical
level, do we accept the universality of Western liberal democratic
norms? If so, is it appropriate to impose them on others, without inter-
rogating whether these norms are in fact applicable to every society?
Should the “rights” that we are considering be seen as relative in nature,
thus depending on cultural context? If not, are we – through our eco-
nomic policies – promoting a form of Western cultural imperialism? It
is questions such as these that will face lawyers, academics, policy-
makers and other interested stakeholders as future situations present
themselves and we, as a society, are compelled to respond. For the
present, the Noranda-Minmetals affair and its surrounding issues remain
a perplexing conundrum.
